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The contemporary problem of semiotics in architecture is an 
inherited struggle, not a chosen one. We consider the 
question of architectural communication because we 
inevitably recognize its centrality to the problem of 
architecture itself.  
 
While the twentieth-century impact of Saussure and his 
birthing of structuralism gave architecture a new ground 
from which to reconceive its own semiotic functions, it was 
probably never possible that such a synchronic and 
undialogic theory would suit such a disparate and 
intersubjective activity. This is not to say that semiotics 
offers no guidance for the problem of architecture. It may 
say, however, that to use semiotics productively is not to 
start from its constructs but instead from architecture’s own.  
 
To that end, this study intends to establish a conceptual 
basis for communication and meaning in architectural form 
by an inquiry into making. The initial judgment about why 
making might prove to be more useful than other 
architectural characteristics is due to is its essential dialogic 
nature; it already is a semiotic. In that sense what follows is 
an opportunistic examination. It arises from what should be 
considered a powerful—if somewhat neglected—text on 
making: Elaine Scarry’s 1985 The Body in Pain. A deeper 
consideration of this work is long overdue. While Scarry’s 
book seems to enjoy a rather wide readership, its potential 
impact has been largely unrealized since few scholars have 
developed its implications. Given the extraordinary 
originality of its argument, the artful construction of its prose, 
and the complex sophistication of its logic, it offers a rich—
albeit demanding—place from which to begin.  
 
The objective of this study is to schematize Scarry’s theory 
of making such that connections to a semiotic 
understanding of its potentials may be realized. Following 
this effort, a short examination of one particular semiotic 
aspect of making will be argued as a tentative ground from 
which to guide further investigation.   
Elaine Scarry’s theory of making 
Elaine Scarry closes her seminal work The Body in Pain by 
moving away from an account of the structures of torture 
and war—what she terms “unmaking—and toward an 
anticipatory proposition on how the “making” of the object 
world could be understood. Her last chapter, “The Interior 
Structure of the Artifact,” is notable not only for its 
compelling thesis of object making in a theoretical realm 
that “is at present in a state of conceptual infancy” (Scarry 
280), but for the potentials of how such a thesis on making 
might illuminate a richer semiotics of architecture.  
 
She proposes the connection between objects and the 
nature of their communicative capacities through her 
“radical formulation” that “artifacts are (in spite of their 
inertness) perhaps most accurately perceived as a ‘making 
sentient of the external world.’” (Scarry 281). Scarry uses 
the term sentient here in its definition as a state or quality of 
perception and consciousness. Scarry says object 
sentience is not a literal consciousness or animism, but is 
instead the active recognition of the struggles of human 
sentience; that it is the task of made objects to act with 
subjects in a discursively empathetic manner by 
recognizing and ameliorating the problems of sentient 
human perception. Scarry calls this function of objects “the 
materialized structure of a perception; [the object] is 
sentient awareness materialized into a freestanding design” 
(290, italics added). Through the consequence of objects 
realized as a concretized human perceptions, it is here in 
Scarry’s argument that the very basis of semiotics within 
subject-object interaction is established. 
 
Scarry then develops the communicative character of the 
made object by distinguishing it as a site of both “projection” 
and “reciprocation.” These actions are the cyclic discourse 
between human subjects and their projection of internal 
needs onto made objects and the subsequent reciprocal 
return of care afforded by that constructed world. The 
actions of projection and reciprocation in Scarry’s theory 
are conceptually distinct—an assertion that we will find has 
semiotic consequences—though their actions are indivisible. 
She states that “the human act of projection assumes the 
artifact’s consequent act of reciprocation” and that “[t]he 
first has no meaning without the second” (Scarry 307). The 
made object sits between the arcs of projection and 
reciprocation, and further, it has the extraordinary capacity 
of magnifying its own effects; “the action of reciprocation is 
ordinarily vastly in excess of the action of projection” 
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and reciprocation, Scarry repeatedly returns to the image of 
a woman making a coat to keep herself warm: 
 
[I]t is clear that [the woman’s] translation of a 
counterfactual wish (“perceiving her own 
susceptibility to cold and wishing it gone”) into the 
projective act of labor requires the embodied 
aversiveness of controlled discomfort. Arms, mind, 
back, eyes, fingers, will all be concentrated on 
bringing about a certain outcome: the sustained 
mental and physical attention seams, shapes, 
materials, is itself an interiorized objectification of 
the original counterfactual wish. . . . But while her 
making of the coat (the first half of the total arc of 
action [projection]) requires a deepened 
embodiment, the coat’s remaking of her (the 
second half of the total arc of action 
[reciprocation]) will bring about her 
disembodiment, divesting her body of its 
vulnerability to external temperatures and 
therefore also freeing her mind of its absorption 
with this problem. In the total arc of action, then, 
she is first more intensively embodied (projection) 
and then disembodied (reciprocation); but clearly 
the level of the second is much greater than that 
of the first. If the second were the exact 
equivalent of the first—if the second relieved her 
of discomfort precisely to the same degree to 
which she had earlier willfully subjected herself to 
discomfort—it would have been senseless to 
make the coat: she might as well have remained 
wholly passive before her environment. Instead, 
the work of the second is vastly in excess of the 
first. (315-316) 
 
The amplifying nature of object reciprocation can be 
described more succinctly; “the degree to which the object 
disembodies or recreates the human makers will ordinarily 
greatly exceed the degree of heightened aversive 
embodiment required to by the projective act of creating the 
object” (Scarry 315).  
 
Collectively, Scarry characterizes the reciprocating effects 
of made objects as a remaking of the subject. Though 
never precisely defined, she uses many synonymous terms 
to give a boundary to the idea of remaking: “self-revision,” 
“self-amplification,” and “re-creation” among others. 
Remaking is, at is heart, a consequence of diminishing the 
aversiveness of human sentience so that this sentience 
might ultimately be enlarged. As Scarry says: 
 
The mental, verbal, and material objects of 
civilization collectively work to vastly extend the 
powers of sentience, not only by magnifying the 
range and acuity of the senses but by endowing 
consciousness with a complexity and large-
mindedness that would be impossible if persons 
were forever engulfed in problematic 
contingencies of the body. (305) 
 
So, the essential value of made objects is the remaking of 
the subject such that sentience is “vastly extended,” senses 
are “magnified in their range and acuity,” and 
consciousness becomes “complex and large-minded.” It 
should be pointed out that these all are semantic conditions, 
and all possible through making. It is Scarry’s thesis that 
the logic of making is itself the logic of human imagination: 
“the made object is simply the made-locus across which the 
power of creation is magnified and redirected back onto its 
human agents who are now caught up in the cascade of 
self-revision they have themselves authored” (323). So, not 
only is the remaking of the subject a functioning of the 
reciprocating capacities of the object world, the discursive 
projection-reciprocation cycle between subject and object 
becomes an ever-enlarging field of human betterment. 
 
While Scarry argues that “the interior structure of the 
artifact” is premised on the communicative sentience of 
made objects, she does not frame the process in any terms 
of semiotic theory. It is something to her credit, perhaps, to 
have left this interpretation to others, since it defers the 
potential banality of an empirical structure from a task she 
poetically describes as being “lost in  . . . a few square 
inches of something far more magnificent in scale” (Scarry 
281). At the same time, she does invent for us a 
provocative and original argument that—in its close reading 
of the meaningful nature of human making—provides open 
connections toward some particularly under-developed 
realms in architectural semiotics, especially semantics. It is 
from these points that this study here intends to build 
Scarry’s invention into a potential ground from which a 
discursive semantic intentionality for architecture could be 
made. 
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Within Elaine Scarry’s theory of making, there are 
numerous points through which semiotics offers a structure 
of analysis and application. The usefulness of such a study 
is not to recast Scarry’s work in alternate terms as much as 
to unfold its impact on the making of objects, its inspiration 
for the practice of design, and—specifically for the purpose 
here—its affect on the creation of meaning in the built 
environment. The study here will focus on Scarry’s 
development of projection and reciprocation and offer a 
potential translation of its effects through semiotics.  
 
As previously discussed, projection is how the human 
subject projects internal needs out onto the world through 
the making of objects. Reciprocation is the subsequent act 
of return engendered by the made object as it affords care 
back to the human subject. The object is a “lever across 
which the force of creation moves back onto the human 
site” and remakes the human subject (Scarry 307). 
“Remaking” the subject is the essential logic of object 
making, and the enlargement of human sentience its 
ultimate goal. 
 
It is through the acts of projection and reciprocation that the 
object world becomes—in Scarry’s argument—“sentient.” 
This is only possible if these two arcs of making are also 
semiotic; that is to say, that they operate as forms of 
communication. In that Scarry connects the processes of 
human making directly to the processes of human 
meaning—the “remaking” of the subject—it is appropriate to 
further define making as semiosis: the “processes and 
effects of the production, reproduction, reception and 
circulation of meaning in all forms, used by all kinds of 
agent[s] of communication” (Hodge and Kress 261) 
 
Since making as semiosis involves the interaction of non-
living and living beings, there is a demonstrable difference 
in the nature of the communication between them. In the 
arc of projection, the subject communicates content to the 
object world; in the arc of reciprocation, the object acts on 
and is read by the subject. The particular semiotic codes 
used in and by each arc are a function of both the 
capacities of each realm—subject and object—to 
communicate to and with each other. But it should be seen 
that projection is the arc most operationally “signifying”; 
because it is communication emanating from the human 
subject, it is the construct of making that is bound directly to 
signification.  
While the full exploration of the semiotics of projection and 
reciprocation awaits a subsequent study, Scarry’s argument 
does guide us toward a point from which to begin: a closer 
inquiry into the specific nature of projection. Ultimately, 
projection will suggest potential processes of judgment in 
designing semantic meaning in architecture, and the 
signification inherent to the subsequent object reciprocation 
will suggest potential claims to the socially constructed 
semantic meanings of ideology. 
 
“Visibility of projection” and 
“accessibility through signification” 
Scarry explicitly recognizes the consequences of what she 
calls the “fictionality or madeness” of projection (312). She 
raises this issue in the consideration of how the common, 
pragmatic, every-day objects of a civilization—the “real” 
objects—operate with human subjects. These objects are 
“the realm of tablecloths, dishes, potted plants, ideological 
structures, automobiles, newspapers, ideas about families, 
streetlights, language, [and] city parks” (Scarry 312). We 
would also understand the general category of 
“architecture” to be included with these “real” objects. The 
value in her question about the madeness of this set of 
objects is that they are “by far the largest category” and so 
among the most important to fully consider (Scarry 312). In 
doing so, she recognizes the particular semiotic condition of 
their projection:  
 
[A]t the stage . . . where these objects must 
function as “real” or self-substantiating, they 
perform this work much more successfully if they 
are not at every moment confessing their origins 
as human projections, and thus will have either 
no signature or an only recoverable, generalized 
human signature. (Scarry 314) 
 
Initially, this statement suggests that common, every-day, 
“real” objects will do their work of reciprocation better if their 
madeness through projection is either weakly signified or 
not at all. Translated into terms of semantics, Scarry is 
saying that the place of meaning in the category of “real” 
objects is most likely located in their capacities of 
reciprocation. [It is beneficial to immediately note the 
potential importance of this idea for engaging the problem 
of semantics in architecture; it suggest that, to the extent 
architecture should be experienced as a “real” object, the 
authorship of its design and the fictiveness of its making 
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reciprocating effects.] 
 
Scarry continues her questions about madeness by further 
delineating realms of objects around the set of “real” objects 
by the nature of their projections. She says that the very 
large set of “real” objects are framed by two very small sets 
of objects: the “super-real” and the “unreal.” The category of 
the “super-real” is those objects whose projection is both 
“unrecognized and unrecoverable”; an example of such an 
object is God. The category of the “unreal” is those objects 
whose projection is not only “recoverable and recognized 
but self-announcing”; examples of such objects are those 
“framed by their fictionality,” like art, poetry, symphonic 
music, or film (Scarry 314). Again, it should be noted that 
we would also understand specific instances—but not all—
of “architecture” to be included with these “unreal” objects.  
 
These categories and their effects of projection offer us a 
place from which to characterize the semantic potentials of 
objects in general. Scarry tells us the consequences of 
projection within these categories of objects: 
 
These three categories are introduced only to 
underscore the fact that at the moment when an 
artifact is recreating us, or reciprocating us, or 
being useful—that is, at the moment when an 
artifact is performing the second half of the arcing 
action—whether or not the first half of that action 
[projection] is visible will depend on whether that 
visibility will interfere with its reciprocating task. 
That visibility will jeopardize the work of the 
[super-real] objects . . . will not jeopardize but will 
interfere with the work of the [real] objects . . . and 
will neither jeopardize nor interfere but will instead 
assist the work of the [unreal] objects . . . (since 
those objects exist both to celebrate and help us 
to understand the nature of creating). (314) 
 
So, as Scarry describes them, the visibility of projection 
increases across the object categories from “super-real,” 
“real,” to “unreal.”  
 
From Scarry’s conceptual framework of objects, we can 
map the function of projective visibility (Figure 1). As every 
object has multiple ways of being both projected and 
reciprocated, we should note that this mapping only 
represents the general and collective nature of the 
projection of objects across the categories, and will not 
describe any one object in particular.  
 
Next, we can focus on a comparison of one of the semiotic 
components of reciprocation: signification. Though Scarry 
never limits her idea of the projection/reciprocation arc only 
to acts of signification, we should realize this to be the 
essential semiotic activity—perhaps overwhelmingly so—in 
the process of both. Signification allows both the expression 
of content as well as the method for accessing other 
content, other semiotic forms of communication. Here we 
might describe the general effect of signification in 
reciprocating acts as the manner of accessing reciprocation. 
In this it is primarily linguistic; the vast effects of signification 
within human experience are routinely and necessarily 
based in language.  
 
It is useful, then, to conceive of the level of accessibility of 
reciprocation through signification. Some very substantial 
assumptions must be made to begin this proposition, but 
these will be seen to become more reasonable through 
subsequent consideration. From an assumption that the 
lowest levels of visibility of projection—for example, God—
tends to encourage, if not require, reciprocating 
signification—“and the Word was God” (John 1:1)—the 
trajectory of the accessibility through signification begins at 
“more.” From a comparative assumption that the highest 
levels of visibility of projection—for example, art—tends to 
defeat attempts at reciprocating signification—“that which is 
most likely art is that which remains unknown the longest” 
(Risher)—the trajectory of the accessibility through 
signification goes to “less.” As with the level of visibility in 
projection, it is necessary to generalize the level of 
accessibility of reciprocation through signification across the 
categories of objects. Even more so than in the visibility of 
projection, this arc of accessibility through signification 
Figure 1: Level of visibility of projection 
through the categories of objects. 
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describe any one object in particular (Figure 2). 
 
In fact, not only will this mapping of accessibility through 
signification not describe any one object in particular, it is 
clear that any object’s level of accessibility through 
signification can be made to be seen to lie outside this 
mapping. A rock picked up on a beach, for instance, would 
normally fall very close to “super-real,” as would most 
products of nature.   These objects are  not  generally 
“projected” into being made as physical things, so their level 
of visibility of projection is low, if not non-existent. 
Conversely, the objects of nature are often reciprocate 
through the elaborate structures of mathematics and the 
sciences, of novels, poetry, and philosophy, and so their 
accessibility through signification is high. However, it is just 
as easy to see this rock reciprocating as a hammer, an 
earring, or a piece of art, which requires a clearly 
decreasing investment in reciprocating signification. In fact, 
to conjure the rock’s reciprocation as art is—almost by 
definition—to defeat its explanation through language. 
 
So, again, the concepts exhibited by the mapping only 
represent a broad generalization of both effects. Within this 
generalization, however, are a number of potential insights. 
For instance, the effects of signification seen at the two 
extremes—where visibility of projection and accessibility 
through signification are most divergent—seem to invoke 
the most abstract form of language; these two extremes 
could be said to be the locations of the discourses 
“theology” and “philosophy.” We might suspect that this kind 
of high-level discourse is required as a function of the 
distance between the object and its level of projection and 
the object’s reciprocating accessibility through language. In 
other words, this says that the greater the distance from 
projection to reciprocating signification, the more 
sophisticated the discourse; conversely, the less the 
distance from projection to signification, the more common 
the discourse. So, as we move in from the two extremes of 
theology/philosophy and this distance becomes reduced, 
we might first sense a linguistic shift more toward the 
character of “theory,” and moving in together even further to 
one of “critique.” In fact, the center region of the mapping—
where the visibility of projection and the accessibility 
through signification have little distance from each other—
holds interesting implications for not only the character of  
language it may suggest, but also for the semantic problem 
of making meaning from objects.  
 
The signifying-projective intersection 
To initiate these possibilities, the region where the visibility 
of projection and the accessibility through signification 
converge will be identified as the “signifying-projective 
intersection” (Figure 3).  
 
In the work to apply these semiotic questions toward the 
problems of architecture, we will advance Scarry’s object 
categories by teaming them with a characterization of 
architectural objects inspired by a semiotic schema of 
Diana Agrest and Mario Gandelsonas (103). These are the 
categories of “non-design,” “design” and “art.”1 Though not 
commensurate in their respective theoretical intentions, the 
categories established by Scarry, Agrest, and Gandelsonas 
become better linked when qualified with some specific 
realms of objects—some of them actually shared between 
the two arguments (Figure 4). 
 
From the previous discussion, we recognize the positions of 
“God” and that of “art” at the two extremes. “Nature” sits in 
Figure 2:  Level of accessibility through 
signification mapped against visibility of 
projection through the categories of objects. 
Figure 3: Figure 3. The signifying-projective 
intersection. 
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made character, though it slides toward the “real/design” 
realm as its manifestations are given boundaries and 
named—a national park, cattle, or Ursa Major, for instance. 
The other realms—“city,” “architecture,” and “objects” 
(meaning the broad world of designed things)—are all 
centered around the category of “real/design.” “City” is the 
object realm that potentially slides toward “super-real/non-
design” in the sense that, in its more chaotic and extreme 
examples, it has an appearance of defeating recoverable 
human projection and appearing almost as a kind of nature. 
On the other hand, all the realms of “city,” “architecture,” 
and “objects” can also be manifest closely to “art.” As 
Scarry describes, at some point, their projection can 
become so fictive and self-announcing that they more 
properly belong in the “unreal,” in the realm of art. The 
location of this boundary between architecture and art, we 
should note, is often a substantive issue when engaged in 
attempts to understand significant architecture.  
 
It is useful to consider the nature of the discourse within the 
realm of the signifying-projective intersection. First, we must 
recognize again that these characteristics of discourse 
represent a general and collective nature along the 
mapping, and will not describe the exact discourse for any 
one particular object. In fact, it is possible to consciously 
engage any form of discourse within the reciprocating 
action of any object. But it is the generalizable conditions of 
discourse at points along the mapping that offers us 
potential conceptual importance.  
 
At the mapping’s extremes—“God” and “art,” in the 
categories of “super-real/non-design” and “unreal/art”—we 
previously anticipated that the reciprocating discourse 
induced is at the sophisticated level of “theology” and 
“philosophy.” From the schema of object realms in Figure 4, 
we can begin to see the logic in proposing that, as we move 
in from the two extremes, the discourse shifts first toward 
“theory” and then toward “critique.” In fact, the point along 
the mapping when we begin to realize “critique” is at the 
same point that the object realm coalesces around the 
category of “real/design.” This is the place in the mapping 
where the nature of objects and their reciprocating 
signifying discourse are very close to each other; where the 
manner in which the object is projected and reciprocated is 
dynamically and intimately connected to linguistic 
signification, to language. This point is the signifying-
projective intersection.  
 
The qualities of the objects at the signifying-projective 
intersection are very significant. These are the objects of 
everyday life: the common things around us engaged 
repeatedly through the needs and desires of our immediate 
human existence. They are experienced consciously as 
well as habitually. Objects in this realm envelop our 
experiences; they can neither be denied nor ignored. 
Further, these are the objects with which we share such an 
intimacy that—if they do not satisfy the requirements of 
making, of projection and reciprocation—they are invariably 
critiqued and modified. At times this critique and 
modification happens within the same moments of our 
engagement with the object; at other times, critique and 
modification is part of a much larger and longer social 
discourse. In terms of shear volume of experience, the 
subject-object interrelationships at the point of the 
signifying-projective intersection are of such a scale that 
they comprise the majority of the human engagement with 
the object world. So, we would recognize that, by definition 
and character, the category of “real/design” must be the 
place where the most subject remaking occurs. This is not 
to say the most meaningful, substantive, or dramatic 
subject remaking occurs in the category of “real/design”—
certainly that can happen in the realms of God and art. But 
it does say that the most common experience of remaking 
occurs here, and so it follows that it is the most familiar site 
of subject remaking as well. Architecture can be located as 
essential within this familiarity. 
 
In his reading of Charles Sanders Peirce and his theory of 
semiotics, Umberto Eco imagines a process by which these 
actions of the signifying-projective intersection might be 
better understood. In “Peirce’s Notion of the Interpretant,” 
Eco considers one of Peirce’s triadic constructs in his 
model of semiosis: representamen, object, and interpretant. 
The  interpretant in Peirce’s model is similar in its the 
operation of signified in Saussure’s model; however, unlike 
Figure 4: Classes of objects between category 
schemas of Scarry, Agrest, and Gandelsonas. 
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in the mind of the interpreter” (Chandler 33). As a sign, the 
interpretant can thus give rise to a new interpretant, which 
can give rise to another, and can continue on in an endless 
chain of signification. Eco terms this particular aspect of 
Peirce’s theory unlimited semiosis—an “infinite network of 
signs referring to signs, as in a finite by unlimited universe 
of semiological ghostly appearances” (Eco 1464). But while 
the concept of unlimited semiosis seems to suggest an 
abstract structuralist loop, Eco is convinced that Peirce’s 
pragmatic nature requires that this problem be reconsidered. 
He believes that “Pierce was interested in objects not so 
much as ontological sets of properties but as occasions and 
results of active experience” (Eco 1465). Gallie reiterates 
this thought in a different way, saying that while 
interpretants “can theoretically be interpreted in some 
further sign . . . [t]he exigencies of practical life inevitably 
cut short such potentially endless development” (Gallie 126).  
 
Eco finds an end to the chain of signification in unlimited 
semiosis through Peirce’s idea of the final interpretant. He 
sees that Peirce’s discussion of the various qualities within 
interpretants—that a sign can produce an “emotional” and 
an “energetic” interpretant—allows the problem of unlimited 
semiosis to be resolved in a way that is the very definition 
of the signifying-projective intersection. Eco says that: 
 
A sign can produce an emotional and an 
energetic interpretant. Considering a musical 
piece, the emotional interpretant is our normal 
reaction to the charming power of music, but this 
emotional reaction may elicit a sort of muscular or 
mental effort. This kind of response is the 
energetical interpretant. . . . But . . . an energetic 
response does not need to be interpreted; it 
rather produces (I guess, by further repetitions) a 
change of habit. This means that after having 
received a series of signs and having variously 
interpreted them, our way of acting within the 
world is either transitorily or permanently changed. 
This new attitude, this pragmatic issue, is the final 
interpretant. (Eco 1465, italics added) 
 
What Eco says here is profound. In the engagement of 
objects in repetitious, habitual situations, there is a point at 
which the chain of signification stops by human action 
induced by the energetic interpretant. From the action that 
follows, “our way of acting within the world is transitorily or 
permanently changed.” It should be clear to us that Eco’s 
proposition connects a specific semiotic process first to the 
signifying-projective intersection—the engagement of 
objects in repetitious, habitual situations—and then 
secondly to a simple rewriting of Scarry’s thesis of 
remaking—the subject’s recreation “within the world.” Here 
in Eco, we have not only an illumination of the processes of 
semiotics for objects in the signifying-projective intersection, 
but also an explanation of why its signifying discourse 
produces subject remaking.  
 
Semantics at the  
signifying-projective intersection 
Eco’s critique of Peirce’s semiotic system takes us to point 
where the action of the final interpretant becomes a path to 
meaning. This work finds semantic potential in how the final 
interpretant is both a construct of the world itself and the 
habits of humans in the world. While this argument will only 
apply itself to the signifying-projective intersection, it offers 
us a theoretical ground from which to consider the location 
of semantic intentions beyond the category “real/design,” 
and toward both “super-real/non-design” and “unreal/art.” 
 
Before returning to Eco, it is useful to introduce ideology as 
a particular realm of potential subject-object semantics. 
Ideology here is not considered in its pejorative sense, but 
through the manner in which “it identifies a unitary object 
that incorporates complex sets of meanings with the social 
agents and processes that produced them” (Semiotics). In 
social semiotics, ideology represents how society 
expresses its social relationships and negotiates interests 
“through motivated versions of social reality” (Hodge and 
Kress 266). This expression and negotiation is 
accomplished by intersubjective semiotic processes. Given 
the substantial economic and political determinations in the 
production of architecture, ideology in this social sense is 
also a beneficial critique toward designing semantics 
through constructs of architectural intention.  
 
So how is the final interpretant connected to the signifying-
projective intersection and how it might manifest meaning?  
 
From his consideration of the final interpretant, Eco goes on 
to illuminate how it acts as within the social sphere as habit. 
The term habit is of keen importance, since it connects 
directly to the conditions of subject-object interrelationship 
as we understand them at the signifying-projective 
intersection, where objects are often engaged repeatedly 
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pragmatism by saying that the “final interpretant as habit” 
has “rules of interaction with the continuum of reality that 
produce individual events and concrete objects of 
perception” (Eco 1466). Translated to the current argument, 
that is to say that the operation of the final interpretant 
occurs in the signifying-projective intersection and is a 
function of semiotic processes. Eco pushes the construct of 
these social rules of interaction further, to a point at which 
we can recognize that what he is actually describing is 
ideology: the normative discursive semiotics of socially-
constructed rules, behaviors, and modification through 
“testing.” Eco says: 
 
Since there are general principles, the ultimate 
meaning or final interpretant of a sign can be 
conceived as the general rule permitting us to test 
or to produce a given habit. The habit produced 
as a sign is both a behavioral attitude acting in 
some regular way and the rule or prescription of 
that action. . . . The objectivity of such a 
pragmatical law is given by the fact that it is 
intersubjectively testable—[ . . . ] there are natural 
tendencies and operational rules allowing all of us 
to test them. (Eco 1466) 
 
So, to the extent that Eco’s functions of the final interpretant 
can be redefined in terms of ideology, it follows that the 
signifying-projective intersection is actually an ideologic 
realm. That is to say, we can consider meaning processes 
through ideology as a basic semantic condition of the 
signifying-projective intersection. Thus, the objects around 
the category of “real/design”—the place of architecture—
can be measured through the socially constructed semantic 
processes of ideology.  
 
To say this is not to have proven something necessarily 
unknown. Ideology and its potential connections to 
architecture has been a conceptual staple among 
contemporary theorists since the rise of structuralist 
semiotics in the 1970s. Perhaps among the most cogent 
arguments about the usefulness of ideological structures 
giving foundation to architectural semiotics is Agrest and 
Gandelsonas’ “Semiotics and the Limits of Architecture.” In 
fact, their work to construct operational strategies of 
metaphor and metonymy, opening and closure, will be of 
great importance to subsequent developments of the 
propositions embedded in this current study. But what may 
be a newly recognized use of ideology here is that the 
possibilities of a semantics in architecture could come from 
an understanding of its foundations through making, rather 
than an external concept of semiotic structuralism. In this 
sense, what has been introduced here is the possibilities of 
an authentic semiotic of architecture rising from its 
manifestation as a made object in the world.  
 
Conclusions in the  
form of propositions 
There are great distances yet to be covered in the task of 
creating a semiotics of making. The effort here has been 
only to introduce connections between Elaine Scarry’s 
theory as it might be redefined through the realm of 
semiotics. The promise in this work is that it offers 
substantially new ground from which to conceive of 
architectural meaning and to guide the production of such 
built form through processes of design practice. 
 
The results already suggest certain propositions for 
subsequent study. As we’ve seen from the illumination of 
only one place on the mapping of projection and 
signification—the signifying-projective intersection—the 
consequences of its semantics of ideology can offer a 
particular measure for how meaning can be expressed in 
architecture. Architecture is located within this intersection, 
and so the question of how ideologic systems work 
semantically—a well established realm of scholarship—
should prove to be enormously beneficial. It should also be 
said that this does not imply that architecture is best 
manifest as a slavish adherent to the semantics of existing 
ideologies; to do so would be—by the consequences of our 
study here—to only communicate what is already defined 
as commonly understood. In fact, it might be learned that 
recognizing the signifying-projective intersection is 
beneficial because architecture should be designed with 
semantic aspects outside the intersection, so that its 
capacities for signifying reciprocation and subject remaking 
are promoted rather than diminished.2  
 
Among other propositions, it will prove important in future 
research to test these semantic measures on seminal 
architectures. This should provide for new perspectives—
perhaps in some cases radically so—from which to judge 
their design achievement. It also promises to open up older 
theories that have included issues of making within their 
logic to new interpretations. Gottfried Semper’s materialist 
theories of ornament and his anthropological view of 
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Architecture, for example, would be among such positions 
to be revisited.  
 
In all, the continued investigation of the semiotics of making 
hold great potential. This is perhaps even more true when 
we consider that the real solutions of the twenty-first 
century may be found in realms of discourse rather than 
empiricism. In such a world, the benefit of a rich and useful 
theory of architectural semiotics is not just desirable, it is 
fundamental. 
 
 
Endnotes 
 
1 The schema proposed by Agrest and Gandelsonas does not include the 
term “art,” but their argument can be seen to be sympathetic to the idea, 
especially regarding art’s relationship to “design”: “[D]esign constitutes a 
set of practices . . . unified with respect to certain normative theories. That 
is, it possesses specific characteristics that distinguish it from all other 
cultural practices and that establish a boundary between what design is 
and what it is not” (Agrest and Gandelsonas 104). 
2 In “Semiotics and the Limits of Architecture,” Agrest and Gandelsonas 
promote exactly this strategy, using a resistance to prevailing ideology as a 
productive critique. “The aim of semiotics is neither the acceptance of the 
ideological definition of architecture nor the proposition of new definitions, 
but rather the displacement of the boundaries established by the 
ideological definitions” (Agrest and Gandelsonas 101).  
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